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Theglass ceilingis oneofthe mostcontroversial andemotive aspects of employment in
organisations. The term appears to have originatedonly in the mid1980s but become
so rapidly sealed in the lexicon that by 1991 the US had created a Federal Glass
Ceiling Commission with the Secretary of Labor as its chair. When setting up the
Glass Ceiling Commission in 1991 the US Department of Labor de…ned the concept
as “those arti…cial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent
quali…ed individuals from advancing upward in their organizations into management-
level positions”; these barriers re‡ect “discrimination... a deep line of demarcation
between those who prosper and those who are left behind.” One only has to look at
the casual empirical evidence to see why the issue remains topical and heated.
Women form a disproportionately small group in senior management positions.
For example, Figure 1 provides the proportion of females in employment amongst US
professions and the proportion of female within those employees working as o¢cials
and managers (US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). Womenconstitute
justover halfofallprofessions but littlemore than athirdof all o¢cials and managers.
Inthe US Fortune 500 womenaccount for only 15.6% of all corporate o¢cer positions
of any type. The situation is even more extreme in Europe (16.5% of positions on
all corporate governing bodies in the US are held by women compared to 7.6% in
Europe).2 Amongst the largest 100 companies in Europe in 2006 there were no
female chief …nancial o¢cers in any company in Germany or France, and one in the
UK. In the US women fair better but even here there are only nine in the largest
100 US companies. As CFO magazine points out ‘the paucity of female …nance chiefs
in Europe is puzzling given the steady ‡ow of women into …nance over the past few
decades’. Indeed, women account for more than half all university graduates in the
EU, and around 30% of MBAs and chartered accountants.
Although some of the disparity could be determined by occupational choice,
women feel that they have to work harder to get promoted and that lower value
is attached to their e¤ort because of their gender. Again there is much anecdotal
evidence. For example, in a recent survey 44% of current business owners women
reported that the statement ‘your contributions were not being recognized or valued’
…tted their personal experience either well or very well, compared to 17% of men.
Ferree and Purkayaastha report women’s experience ‘that you have to be twice as
good to get half as far at higher levels of management’ (Ferree and Purkayaastha
(2000)).3 Heilman (2001) suggests ‘when women perform valuable work this may go
2Figures for 100 largest US corporations relative to 100 largest European companies.
3Women working on Wall Street as brokerage …rm equity analysts are more likely to be highly
rated by external assessments (e.g., designated as All-Stars by the Institutional Investor magazine)
than their male counterparts yet on average within their …rm they are allocated fewer stocks to cover3
unacknowledged as their achievements are more likely to be attributed to external
factors’. Interestingly, there also appear to be signi…cant but complex di¤erences
between organisations within sector in terms of female employment. Obviously there
is bound to be a variance but, more signi…cantly, these di¤erences appear to persist.
For example, Cohen et al (1998) showthat within the US savings and loans industry,
savings and loans employing larger proportions of females are more likely to hire and
promote women. Furthermore they show that this e¤ect is statistically signi…cantly
stronger for promotion than for hiring. That it appears that, within the same sector,
some …rms are more female friendly than others.
Furthermore, not only do women form a minority of employees at senior levels,
they also receive lower remuneration thanmen. This disparity is re‡ected throughout
senior management. Figure 2 shows the relative salary of educatedwomen (according
to highest education attainment) to equivalent educated men in the US from 1990 to
date. The ratio for both women with bachelors degree and those with an advanced
quali…cation(i.e., higher thanbachelors) arerelatively constant andvery similar, with
mean values below 0.6 across the period.4 Although over 15% of all corporate o¢cers
of Fortune 500 companies are female only 2.7% of their top earners are women.5
There is, of course, considerable theoretical and empirical debate as to what the
glass ceiling actually is. The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission describes it as a
barrier to obtaining management-level positions but many think of it as a barrier
to obtaining the better management positions. Morrison et al (1987), one of the
early authoritative sources on the topic, describe it as ‘a transparent barrier that
kept women from rising above a certain level in corporations ... It applies to women
as a group who are kept from advancing higher because they are women’. Some
authors argue that within organisations the glass ceiling is ‘quite low’.6 For example,
Reskin and Padavic (1994) suggest that the glass ceiling and the ‘sticky ‡oor’ are
indistinguishable. We side-step this debate and assume that the glass ceiling refers to
thesituationwhere, amongst the group of employees that are hiredto …ll management
slots within anorganisation, a disproportionately small groupof womenget promoted
to the upper partof the management chain and receivelower remunerationonce there.
Although economists have not theorized on the phenomena, there is no shortage
ofexplanations in other …elds. One explanation, ofcourse, is that there is pure gender
than their male equivalent. Interestingly woman form a declining proportion of Wall Street brokerage
…rm equity analysts positions (falling from 16% in 1995 to 13% in 2005) but the employment evidence
in overall appears to be more consistent with some form of self-selection than gender discrimination
(Green et al (2007).
4Several papers con…rm empirically the existence of a ‘glass ceiling’ in earnings (e.g., Albrecht et
al (2001), de la Rica et al (2005) and Arulampalam et al (2004)).
52.7% of the 2,500 top earners (made up of the top …ve for each of the Fortune 500 companies).
6Britton and Williams (2000).4
discrimination and there is evidence of pure discrimination in some arenas (see, for
example, Goldin and Rouse (2000) and Neumark (1996)).
In contrast, strands of the evolutionary psychology literature argue a di¤erence in
genetic predisposition is responsible for the appearance of a ceiling on women’s earn-
ings and positions in management hierarchy. For example, Babcock and Laschever
(2003) argue that women are poor negotiators and generally dislike the process of
negotiating. Browne (1995, 1998) suggests that men are more interested in striving
for status in hierarchies and ‘engage in risk taking behaviour that is often necessary
to reach the top of hierarchies’. Kanazawa (2005) uses General Social Survey data
to show that men rank …nancial reward and power positions much higher in their
preferences for employment, concluding that since men covet and strive for such po-
sitions they are the ones likely to succeed in achieving them, whereas “women have
better things to do”. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) use experiments where subjects
perform a task and are able to choose between non-competitive piece rate and a com-
petitive tournament. There is a signi…cant gender gap in choice with 35% of women
and 73% of men selected the tournament. Gneezy et al (2003) also test performance
in competitive environments and …nd within their sample that the bottom perfor-
mance quintile is almost entirely composed of women. Indeed, some of the literature
argues that this may not be true but the perception that it is limits the opportunities
for women to be o¤ered positions that provide equal opportunities for advancement
(White (1992)).
Psychologists …nd gender e¤ects in what they call the “romance of leadership”.
Essentially, the idea is that the outcome of good events is incorrectly attributed ex-
post to good leadership rather than random draws. This phenomenon is referred to
as the romance of leadership. In experiments where subjects are asked to allocate
bonuses in hypothetical situations Kulich et al (2007)) show that, while the romance
of leadership is present for both sexes, higher company performance does not lead to
allocation of higher bonus for women. Indeed, women only receive bonuses based on
perceptions of their charisma.
In contrast, to the voluminous theorizing in other social sciences, economists have
not provideda formal model ofthe glass ceilingphenomenon as such that is consistent
with the features outlined above. There is no economic model explaining whether,
and if so how, a glass ceiling can arise as an equilibrium in the workplace if there
is no ‘discrimination’ against women.7 The gender speci…c features described above
are inevitably the outcome of many factors but an interesting research exercise is to
see if they can be explained as the outcome of a competitive process. One attraction
7There is, of course, a signi…cant theoretical literature on statistical discrimination (stemming
from the seminal papers of Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973)) but this does not ‘explain’ several of
the features of the glass ceiling.5
of seeking an equilibrium explanation is that it helps to understand the role and
limitations of “anti-discrimination” policies. The purpose of this paper is to provide
such an equilibrium economic theory of the glass ceiling. We are able to show that,
although it clearly disadvantages career focused women, we can characterise all these
features in equilibrium as the natural outcome of a competitive process. To what
extent these features, therefore constitute discrimination is not obvious. In our model
there is a group of women who are clearly disadvantaged in many dimensions, relative
to the equivalent male, but this is the consequence of employees engaging in Bertrand
competition rather than exhibiting discrimination in the traditional manner.
We suggest the factors that an attractive theoretical model of the glass ceiling
should seek to explain are the following observations: (i) the lower number of female
employees in higher positions, (ii) the fact that women feel that they have to work
harder than men to obtain what appear to be equivalent jobs, (iii) on average women
are then paid less than men when promoted, and (iv) some organisations appear to
more female friendly than others (that otherwise appear to be identical).8
These four conditions are not trivial to reconcile. For example, if women have
to work harder to achieve the same level of promotion then, if this has an e¤ect
on future productivity, it should increase it. Hence on average those women who
make the higher level should be more attractive to employers than the typical male
employee and are likely to receive higher not lower remuneration. Indeed this point
has been made very clearly by Fryer (2006) who explores what happens to individuals
who are successful within a statistical discrimination model. He identi…es conditions
for belief ‡ipping, whereby groups that are statistically discriminated against at one
level actually become positively favored at the upper level. Indeed in general if forces
with similar e¤ects to discrimination restrict promotion then those promoted should
be more valuable and paid more. The model we present has no discriminationagainst
women but displays all the four features described above in equilibrium.
The model depends on gender di¤erences and, although having a di¤erent focus
and outcome to the evolutionary psychology literature mentioned above, it has some
similarities with some of the existing literature. The closest model to ours is that
of Lazear and Rosen (1990). They assume that women have, on average, higher
non-market options than men and are more likely to leave employment as a result.
Consequently, in equilibrium the average ability of promoted women must be higher
than men. The implication is that a smaller number of women are promoted but
as suggested above, because of the di¤erence in ability of those promoted relative to
8Note that we are not claiming that these four features are all obviously unambiguously empir-
ically ‘true’. The lower number of females in senior positions is an undisputable fact but whether
the others are true depends on the conditioning factors. Our aim is to see if a plausible economic
theory can explain these phenomena.6
their male counterparts, women that are promoted earn more on average than men.
In contrast, in our theory women may earn less than male counterparts. The primary
similarity between our model and that of Lazear and Rosen is that we both assume
that womenhavenon-market options thatmen do not have. However, inour approach
the relative value of non-market options is endogenous. The endogeneity plays a
major role in the story since manipulation of the value of employment compared to
the non-market options o¤ers a pre-commitment strategy for those women who are
less inclined to favor the non-market options.
A particular attraction of our model is that, although at times the results are
not trivial to establish formally, the core forces that drive the equilibrium e¤ects
have a simple intuition. Here we provide a brief summary of the driving forces.
Central to our story is the idea that employers believe (correctly) that on average
a female employee is more inclined to leave or take a break in employment than an
otherwise identical male employee.9 At one extreme this can take the form of short
employment breaks for each physical birth and the immediate consequent childcare
(easily observable and contractible) and at the other extreme could take the form of
reducing their “commitment” to the job and restricting the sacri…ces they are willing
to make as their career develops. The latter is far harder to measure and generally
not contractible. Preferences over lifestyles di¤er, however, and so women themselves
will di¤er signi…cantly in the extent that the possibility of taking leave or a break
in employment is a real issue for them. But these di¤erences in preferences will be
private information. Of course, this feature is not unique to di¤erences rooted in
gender. It can apply to a broad class of cases (we discuss others below) but we
believe it is particularly relevant for a discussion of the glass ceiling phenomena.
A critical assumption is that there is more diversity in women with regard to this
aspect of job commitment than men, who as a result have less potential for private
information in this regard. Indeed, to keep things simple and to focus on the main
issue, we assume in our model that men all display the same “commitment” to career
but that women di¤er with regard to this. Women learn their preference but, as
indicated, this is private information. One way of thinking about our model is that
women are more productive than men in that they can do equivalent work in the
workplace but also have alternative options that are not available for men. However,
this very potential ‡exibility turns out to be harmful.
In this framework a woman whose personal commitment is, say, identical to the
male group faces a clear problem that an otherwise equivalent male employee does
not face. Such women ‘lose’ in two intertwined ways in our model.
9The CFO (Chief Finance O¢cer) Magazine (8th March 2007) claimed that... ‘around 40% of
women step o¤ the career ladder at some point, most often driven by ‘pull’ factors such as having
children or caring for a parent, rather than ‘push’ factors, such as career-related stress’.7
First, since the (potential) alternative options have no value to her, she may value
a pre-commitment strategy that reduces the attraction of the alternatives, providing
this is observable. This is something that men do not have to do. For example, by
working harder a woman may be able to signal her commitment. That is, working
‘abnormally’ hard may have a signi…cant impact on promotion and …nancial returns if
it is clear that working so hard changes the ex-post returns in such a way that leaving
for alternative options is now sub-optimal. Such a strategy can sort employees by
type.
The second way that women can lose is that …rms will only o¤er as much as they
need to meet competitor’s o¤ers. So there is no guarantee that these women obtain
the equivalent return from this extra e¤ort that a male employee would earn.
The formal model and the main results are loosely as follows. There are two
technologically identical …rms competing for employees.10 Employees are hired at a
low management level and each …rm has need for one senior management slot for
every two lower level management positions. The higher level managers are chosen
from the intake at the lower level in the previous period. The amount of e¤ort that
employees put in at the lower level a¤ects their productivity in a higher level but has
no impact on their output in the second period if they are not promoted. It is this
amount of work at the initial stage of the career that can act as a pre-commitment
device. The …rms compete (basically Bertrand-style) at an initial contract stage by
o¤ering contracts to the market. We analyze what happens when contracts can be
made gender speci…c with a view to understanding the impact on the equilibrium
when various possible legal anti-discrimination restrictions are placed on the market.
Employees approach the …rm that o¤ers the best contract for them and then take
up the other o¤er if they are not chosen by that …rm. A contract o¤ers promotion
conditional on a speci…c amount of e¤ort in the …rst period. This e¤ort level may
(explicitly or implicitly) be gender speci…c.
We assume that women di¤er in their preference for a career break (which is costly
to employers). Whether this option is worthwhile to pursue, however, is endogenous
to the model. Harder work increases productivity and in equilibrium a¤ects the salary
at the higher level, so this is an observable way that a woman can change ex-post
commitment to the job. The equilibrium has two important features.
One is that …rms di¤er in their proportion of female employees that are hired
(even though …rms make identical pro…t in equilibrium). The less “female friendly”
…rm is unattractive for the women who want good promotion opportunities. Because
the ‘female unfriendly’ …rm’s o¤er is unattractive, it limits how much the “female
friendly” …rm needs to o¤er to attract female workers.
10We think of the two …rm market being sustained by entry costs that limit the number of …rms
that can be accommodated in the market.8
The second feature follows from the …rst. Since there is a limit on how much
the “female friendly” …rm needs to o¤er to attract female workers, a woman who is
promoted has to work harder than anequivalent male (to ensure precommitment) and
yetmayreceive alowersalary whenpromoted. Furthermore, this outcome is sustained
even when the male promotion o¤er (i.e., a contract that o¤ers guaranteed promotion
for the male promotion-e¤ort level) is also su¢cient to provide full pre-commitment
when o¤ered to women. That is, if …rms o¤ered the male contract to women then all
the women taking this contract would become identical in productivity terms to men
(i.e., would never wish to leave the …rm) but the equilibrium still provides a worse
alternative for women.
What is the basic intuition why, even in the presence of Bertrand competition,
women who work harder cannot receive full reward for this extra e¤ort? Essentially a
…rm cannot employ only women since there will not be enough to …ll the more senior
jobs. That is, men are not completely ‘priced’ out of the …rms hiring plans even when
female workers have a ‘lower price’. As a result of the need to employ some men,
there will not be enough female jobs in the female friendly …rm for all the women who
would like them. Those that cannot …nd a job here end up in the female unfriendly
…rm, which o¤ers a worse package. So the female friendly …rm can itself extract a
small surplus per female employee. However, both …rms make the same pro…t. The
female friendly …rm has more women than the unfriendly one but pays them more.
So the female friendly …rm extracts a smaller surplus per female but has more of
them whereas the female unfriendly …rm has fewer female employees but extracts a
higher surplus from each one. In equilibrium each …rm has no incentive to change its
o¤er.
Thus the model provides an explanation for the glass ceiling phenomenon that,
although it disadvantages career focused women, is the natural outcome of a compet-
itive process. We are able to show that this equilibrium does not depend on being
able to o¤er gender speci…c contracts. However, if promotion rules (such as minimum
promotion ratios for women) are imposed on the organization then the equilibrium
can change to improve the position of those women who have a low preference for
career breaks. A central feature of our approach that separates our conclusions from
other discrimination models is that these restrictions cannot be temporary incur-
sions into the labor market to shift the equilibrium to a more favorable one in a
multi-equilibrium environment.11 In our model the interventions would have to be
“permanent” and in practice would require considerable information for the policy
maker (although no more than is available to the agents in the model).
Before moving to the main body of the paper it is useful to discuss the potential
11Although many models have the feature that a¢rmative action only needs to be temporary, this
is not always the case (see Coate and Loury (1993)).9
applicability of the model. Although we have focused on gender we see the model as
being relevant for many observationally distinguished groups. An immediate broad
analogy is thetreatment ofimmigrant employees (particularly where the cultureofthe
country they have left is very di¤erent from the host country). If employers correctly
believe that there is a higher probability the foreign employee may wish to return at
some point then a similar pre-commitment problem arises for employees who have no
preference for returning. An alternative anecdotal example (encountered by one of
the authors) concerned a full time employee who enjoyed writing novels in his spare
time. He claimed that he always felt disadvantaged relative to his colleagues since
it was always implied that he was not as committed to the career as others because
“surely he would really prefer to be a full time author” and was only waiting for the
opportunity. He claimed this question arose to di¤ering degrees of directness at every
appraisal he ever had and that he thus felt obliged to display greater commitment to
the cause than other employees.
In terms of the relevance of the model to the glass ceiling debate, the endogene-
ity/exogeneity of the gender di¤erences needs some discussion. The paper relies on
the primitive that women are more inclined than men to take some element of dis-
ruption in their career path. Where this is observable (e.g., formal breaks can be
measured whereas lower willingness to make sacri…ces may not be) the empirical evi-
dence is clear (the extent di¤ers between countries). However, although the empirical
evidence vastly supports the disparity in short and long term disruption, one has to
be careful in attributing all of this to an exogenous characteristic of genders. While
disruption to physically have children and the immediate childcare can be treated as
exogenous di¤erences, one has to be careful when dealing with longer breaks. Some
of this may be endogenous within the process, i.e., di¤erences between genders in
tendency to take breaks will be magni…ed by the equilibrium process, particularly if
there are no legal restrictions on employer behavior.
The next section describes how we model the environment as a game. Section
3 provides a characterization of equilibrium of the game. Section 4 provides a dis-
cussion on the extent to which our analysis can be generalized and addresses policy
implications. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Model
Weconsider alabor market withtwopopulationsof workers, male(m) and female(f),
of the same measure 2. All male workers are ex ante identical. Female workers di¤er
in their attitude towards career vs family, so they di¤er in their likelihood to leave
their jobs for some non-market activities in the future. We model this heterogeneity
as follows: each female worker has a private type ￿ drawn from a commonly known
cdf G on [0;1], where ￿ is the probability that she receives a positive shock while on10
the job (the precise timing to be speci…ed later). If hit by a shock, the value of her
outside, non-market option jumps to ^ u from 0, where ^ u > 0:5 is a …xed value. For
simplicity, we assume G is uniform.
There are two …rms, A and B, that are ex ante identical: each …rm has a measure
2 of low-rank positions to …ll in period 1 and a measure 1 of high-rank/managerial
positions to …ll in period 2. All workers (male and female) have the same productivity
in low(-rank) posts, which we normalize to 0. However, they can make a human
capital investment/e¤ort, e 2 <+ in period 1, that would increase their productivity
in the next period if they get promoted to a high-rank position. The worker’s cost of
making e¤ort is quadratic, c(e) = 1
2e2, and is sunk at this stage. The exerted e¤ort
level is observable only by the …rm that he/she works for. Female workers learn their
private types, ￿, early in period 1, in particular, before the e¤ort decision.
In period 2, workers may get promoted to high-rank posts. A promoted worker
generates a total revenue of yH(e) = 1 + e for the …rm that realizes at the end of
period 2, where e is the e¤ort exerted in period 1. However, at the midpoint of period
2, female workers are hit by a shock with their private probability ￿, in which case
they choose whether to remainin the job and get the contracted wage or leave the job
forfeiting the wage for the second half of period two12 and get ^ u, the utility from the
newly available outside option. We assume that if a worker leaves a high-rank post
no revenue is generated by that post for that period unless it is replaced by another
worker who has held a high rank job in either …rm, in which case the revenue would
be the same as when the lower-productivity worker of the two has kept the post for
the entire period.
All workers that do not get promoted enter a competitive, unskilled job market
for period 2, where they generate a constant ‡ow revenue of 1 + • after retraining
which costs • > 0 for the employer. Hence, competitive employers pay a ‡ow wage
that leaves them zero expected pro…t: wm = 1 for men and wf < 1 for women. Here,
wf < 1 re‡ects the market’s expected loss in revenue due to the departure prospect of
female workers for the non-market option of ^ u in the middle of period 2. We assume
that • is very small, so that wf is close to 1. For ease of exposition, we treat wf as
exogenous, although it can be determined endogenously in equilibrium taking into
account what types of women enter the unskilled market, without a¤ecting the main
results.
Prior to period 1, the two …rms compete in attracting workers by o¤ering more
favorable (for the workers) contracts than their rivals, i.e., in the spirit of Bertrand
12In principle, the contract may specify that she will forfeit the salary for the entire period 2.
The …rm would still su¤er some damage from such departures, which is an alternative interpretation
of one half of the wage paid to the departing worker. There also can be some “retiring” payment
and/or moral hazard prior to departures.11
competition. We model this process in two stages.
In the …rst stage, called the “campaign” stage, the two …rms publicly announce
their terms of employment/contract o¤ers during an interval I of time. Speci…cally,
a “contract” C
g
i = (e;s) speci…es a gender g 2 fm;fg, an e¤ort level e ¸ 0 (to be
quali…ed for promotion), and a ‡ow salary level s ¸ 0 in period 2 (to be paid if
promoted). Note that a contract does not specify the salary in period 1, which we
assume is equal to the productivity, 0. This assumption is for ease of exposition, and
our main results extend to the case that a contract speci…es period 1 salary as well.
There are various ways of modelling the speci…cs of the …rms’ announcement
strategies, for instance, whether they may announce only once or multiple times,
whether they may announce only at designated discrete points or anytime in I (dis-
crete vs. continuous time model), etc, and the results are sensitive to such details.
Here, we specify three rules to capture the Bertrand competition between …rms and
leave other details unspeci…ed because, as it turns out, these are adequate for our
equilibrium characterization:
(A1) Both …rms are required to have announced one contract for each gender by the
end of I.
(A2) Once a contract C
g
i = (e;s) is announced, …rm i may revise it during I but only
for the better for the worker, that is, may reduce e and/or increase s.13
(A3) There is a …nal point in time when either …rm may revise/announce contracts,
i.e., I is right-closed.
We require (A3) because collusive outcomes are easily supported by punishment
threats without it. A strategy in the campaign stage speci…es a plan to announce
and revise contracts according to (A1)-(A3).
After the campaignstage is concluded with the…nal contracts fC
g
ig, i = A;B, and
g = f;m, the workers get matched with the …rms in an “allocation” stage. A precise
modeling of this process, such as initial application and selection procedures and the
second matching process of un…lled posts and residual labor supply, would necessarily
involve nontrivial ad hoc assumptions. Hence, we take an alternative approach of
directly postulatingworkforceallocationoutcomes based on the fundamental principle
that the …rm o¤ering a more favorable contract gets the …rst pick in hiring decisions.
Here an allocation outcome refers to a speci…cation of measures „
g
i of gender g 2
fm;fg workers hired by …rm i 2 fA;Bg, such that „m
i + „
f





B = 2 for g = f;m.
13Alternatively, the …rms are allowed to o¤er additional contracts during I and the workers choose
one of the contracts o¤ered for its gender after hired.12
For each female contract C
f
i one can calculate the ex ante (face) value that a
worker of gender g can derive from this contract, presuming that the speci…ed terms
of promotion will always be honored. This value, denoted by v(C
f
i ), is formally
de…ned later.14 The …rm o¤ering a female contract with a higher value has priority
in hiring women as speci…ed below.
Valuation of male contracts is di¤erent due to the homogeneity of male workers.
Since they can guarantee a utility of 1 by exerting no e¤ort and getting an unskilled
job in period 2 (i.e., forgoing promotion), the value of any male contract is at least
1. On the other hand, even if …rm i o¤ers a contract (e;s) with s ¡ e2=2 > 1, as
long as this …rm hires more than measure 1 of male workers they would compete
for promotion and as a result, they end up exerting an e¤ort level, say ~ e > e, that
restores equivalence of pursuing promotion and not, i.e., s ¡ ~ e2=2 = 1. Whichever
male contract a …rm o¤ers, therefore, it is at least as attractive as the other …rm’s if
the other …rm hires more than measure 1 of male. This means that either …rm is at
least as well placed as the other …rm in hiring additional male workers up to measure
1.
Based on these observations, we postulate the labor force allocation as below15:
(B1) The …rm, say A, o¤ering a female contract with a strictly higher value …rst
hires as many women as it wants, and as many men as it wants up to measure
1. Then, …rm B …lls all its posts with the residual labor force. Finally, …rm A
hires any remaining workers.
(B2) If the two …rms o¤er female contracts of the same value, they are allocated
measure 1 of each gender. Then, a …rm may propose an alternative allocation,
which is implemented if accepted by the other …rm.
A strategy of each …rm in an allocation stage with …nal contracts fC
g
i g is a hiring




B), and a decision as to which alternative





After the contracts fC
g
i g are o¤ered and workforce is allocated as f„
g
ig, a “pro-
motion” subgame ensues, comprising periods 1 and 2. During these periods …rms
14Since it is de…ned without reference to equilibrium, v(C
f
i ) is not necessarily the equilibrium
utility of a female worker hired by …rm i, because promotion may not be pursued in the exact terms
speci…ed in the contract. However, this potential discrepancy is not signi…cant enough to invalidate
using v(C
f
i ) to assess the relative attractiveness of the two …rms’ female contracts. Alternatively,
one can use equilibrium values of contracts in this assessment, however this would complicate the
exposition without additional insights.
15This allocation would ensue if the actual matching process is, for instance, as follows: All workers
apply to both …rms (at no cost) and the …rms have one chance of o¤ering positions and the workers
choose among the o¤ered positions (randomly if equivalent o¤ers), given that the …rms have to …ll
all positions to operate.13
cannot …re workers, however workers may leave the …rm at any time, forgoing any
unpaid ‡ow salary. At the beginning of period 1 all female workers learn their private
types ￿, and every worker in either …rm exerts an e¤ort level e 2 <+ observable only
by the employer. In period 2, each …rm decides who to promote based on gender and
exerted e¤ort level, and pays them the salaries speci…ed in the relevant contracts.16
All unpromoted workers leave the …rm and get an unskilled job that pays a ‡ow wage
of wg.
A worker may sue the …rm if he/she was not promoted after exertingan e¤ort level
at least that speci…ed in the contract, together with a claim that some high posts are
either vacant or occupied by workers who failed to meet their contracted e¤ort levels.
If the claim is veri…ed to be true, then the court …nds in favor of the plainti¤ and
a hefty compensation payment is ordered from the …rm to the plainti¤. We assume
a su¢ciently high veri…ability of e¤ort levels so that such breach of contract would
never take place.
At the midpoint of period 2, female workers get hit by a positive shock with their
private probabilities ￿, in which case they may leave the job and get the non-market
option of ^ u. In case a positive measure of high posts becomes vacant due to such
departure, the …rms may try to …ll vacant positions by recruiting workers in the high
posts of the other …rm witha higher salary. This wouldinevitably launch a recruiting
war between the two …rms, pushing the salaries of all high-post workers up to their
productivities, thereby depleting any positive pro…t of the …rm.
In a promotion subgame of …rm i with contracts C
g
i and allocation „
g
i, g = m;f,
eachworker’s strategy consists ofane¤ort level, decisions astowhether to sue the…rm
or not in relevant contingencies, and for female workers, the decisions as to whether
to leave the employment for the non-market option of ^ u when hit by a positive shock;
and …rm i’s strategy speci…es who to promote based on gender and exerted e¤ort
level (contingent on the pro…le of e¤orts exerted by all workers), and the recruiting
decisions when some high posts are vacated in the middle of period 2. Each worker
maximizes the expected value of income stream, including that from non-market
option and compensation from lawsuit, net of the e¤ort cost. Each …rm maximizes
the expected pro…t, i.e., total revenue net of total salary and lawsuit-compensation
payments.
16That is, the …rm commits to the salary speci…ed in the contract for all promoted workers
regardless of the e¤ort exerted. This amounts to disallowing renegotiation at the point of promotion.
Upward renegotiation would not happen even if allowed because the worker has no bargaining
power given that the other …rm does not know the exerted e¤ort level. It is sensible that downward
renegotiation is precluded for workers who met the contracted e¤ort level because the contract would
be upheld in the court. Even for workers who did not meet the contracted e¤ort level, downward
renegotiation would not be worth for the …rm to pursue if veri…cation of e¤ort level is very costly
and the worker is …nancially constrained.14
A strategy pro…le in this promotion subgame, together with a belief pro…le on the
type distribution of female workers contingent on the exerted e¤ort level, constitutes
a (perfect Bayesian) continuation equilibrium of this subgame if the strategies are
mutual best-responses and the belief pro…le satis…es Bayes rule whenever possible.
A strategy pro…le of the two …rms in the campaign stage, a strategy pro…le of the
two …rms in the allocation stage for each possible set of …nal contracts fC
g
i g, and a
pro…le of continuation equilibria for every possible promotion subgame, constitute a
(subgame-perfect) equilibrium of the grand game if, given the pro…le of continuation
equilibria, i) the strategy pro…le in the allocation stage contingent on fC
g
i g is an
equilibrium in the continuation game, and ii) the strategies in the campaign stage are
mutual best-responses given the rest of strategies.





ig contingent on fC
g
ig, and the ensuing e¤ort pro…le of
the workers and the promotion decisions, that arise in an equilibrium. We now char-
acterize the equilibrium outcome.
3. Equilibrium Characterization
If a …rm hires female workers for a contract (e;s) with s < 2^ u, then the female worker
in high posts would leave employment if a non-market option of value ^ u becomes
available at the midpoint of period 2, because the value of the income stream they
forgo by leavingat that pointis s=2 < ^ u. On the other hand, female workers promoted
according to a contract (e;s) with s ¸ 2^ u would never leave the employment. We
describe the…rst kindof female promotionas “insecure,” and the latter kind“secure”.
Here, we take a view that the nature of positive shocks is such that when a non-
market option becomes available after insecure promotion, departure is irreversible
and renegotiation of salary is irrelevant at that point. Contract o¤ers for secure
promotion can be interpreted as preempting any such shocks by ensuring an income
stream higher than any shock may bring.
If a …rm hires female workers for insecure promotion, then it is certain that a
positivemeasure ofhigh posts will be vacatedinthe middleof period2. As mentioned
earlier, this wouldinevitably launcha recruitingwar between two …rms, wipingout all
of …rms’ surplus from high posts. Foreseeing this, neither …rm would hire for insecure
promotion in equilibrium. We take this as granted and no longer consider insecure
promotion,17 i.e., we implicitly assume that all female contracts (e;s) considered
below satisfy s ¸ 2^ u.
As will be veri…ed shortly, the e¢cient male contract to be o¤ered is (em;sm) =
(1;1:5), so that male workers get promoted by exerting an e¤ort level of 1. If ^ u =
17The potential of recruiting war facilitates our analysis by providing a simple logic to eliminate
insecure promotion as being a dominated strategy. However, it is not essential for our result because
insecure promotion may be dominated without it.15
3=4, the minimal female salary for secure promotion is also 1.5. By o¤ering the
e¢cient male contract to women as well, therefore, a …rm can ensure that female
workers up for promotion are identical to men: they generate the same revenue of 2
without any risk of departure and will be paid the same salary of 1.5. If the …rms
choose to o¤er a di¤erent female contract nonetheless, it cannot be explained by the
general observation that male and female workers respond di¤erently to the same
incentives. For this reason, we are particularly interested in the cases that ^ u is near
3/4. Therefore, we will present the analysis assuming that ^ u = 3=4, and discuss
later that the main results and insights do not change in nearby cases, although the
nominal high-cost compensation is lower for female workers if ^ u < 3=4 but is higher
if ^ u > 3=4.
A. Employing male workers
Since men are guaranteed a utility of 1 by forgoing promotion, any male contract
(em;sm) that induces promotion should satisfy sm ¡ e2
m=2 ¸ 1. Subject to this
constraint, the …rm’s surplus per promotion, 1 + em ¡ sm, is uniquely maximized at
em = 1 and sm = 1:5, with the maximum surplus of 0.5.
Lemma 1: The maximum surplus of a …rm per male promotion is 0.5, which is
uniquely obtained by the “e¢cient” male contract C¤
m = (1;1:5).
B. Employing female workers
If a woman forgoes promotion, she would exert no e¤ort, get an unskilled job for
a wage of wf < 1, and would leave the employment for a non-market option of ^ u at
midpoint with probability ￿, which warrants an expected utility of
u‘(￿) := wf + ￿(^ u ¡ wf=2): (1)
On the other hand, if she pursues promotion as per a contract (e;s), she would get a
utility of s ¡ e2=2 regardless of ￿. Since the utility of non-promotion u‘(￿) increases
in ￿, there is a unique critical/threshold type that solves u‘(￿
c) = s ¡ e2=2, so that
female workers would pursue promotion if of a type lower than this threshold type,
and not otherwise. Therefore, it proves useful to think of a secure promotion contract




‘ (s ¡ e
2=2):
Given a secure promotion contract (e;s) with a threshold type ￿
c = ￿
c(e;s),
a female worker would get a utility of u‘(￿
c) by pursuing promotion if of a type
￿ < ￿
c(e;s), or else would get a utility of u‘(￿) by not pursuing promotion. Hence,












Note that this values only depends on the threshold type and strictly increases in ￿
c.
This is the value of contracts used in allocation rules (B1) and (B2).
Given a threshold type ￿ 2 (0;1), of all secure promotion contracts (e;s) such
that ￿
c(e;s) = ￿, the contract that maximizes the per-promotion surplus of the …rm,
1+ e ¡ s, is
(e;s) = (
p
2(1:5¡ u‘(￿)); 1:5) if u‘(￿) · 1
and
(e;s) = (1; u‘(￿) +0:5) if u‘(￿) ¸ 1:
Consequently, the maximum surplus per-promotion is
p
2(1:5¡ u‘(￿)) ¡ 0:5 if u‘(￿) · 1; and 1:5¡ u‘(￿) if u‘(￿) ¸ 1:
Let ¹ ￿ be such that u‘(¹ ￿) = 1, that is,
¹ ￿ :=
2^ u ¡ 0:5¡ wf
^ u ¡ 0:5wf
2 (0;0:5):
Lemma 2: Fix arbitrary ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿). Conditional on inducing female promotion
with a threshold type ￿, the maximum per-promotion surplus is
…f(￿) :=
p
2(1:5 ¡ u‘(￿))¡ 0:5 > 0:5:




Note that …f(￿) strictly decreases in ￿ down to …f(¹ ￿) = 0:5.
As long as female promotion is induced with a threshold type ￿ 2 (¹ ￿;1), the
per-promotion surplus is less than 0.5.
A graphical illustration might be useful. Consider ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿) depicted in the …rst
diagram of Figure 3. The part of the graph of u‘(￿) + c(e) in the second diagram
above the horizontal line at level 1.5, is the set of all contracts (e;s) that would
induce secure female promotion with the threshold type ￿. Of these the one that
maximizes the surplus, 1 + e ¡ s, is depicted by the intersection point of this graph
and the horizontal line at level 1.5. The horizontal coordinate of this point is ef(￿)
and the vertical distance from this point to the line 1+e is …f(￿) which decreases as
￿ increases from 0 until …f(¹ ￿) = 0:5.
[Figure 3 about here]
C. Optimal hiring with unconstrained workforce17
Suppose there is unconstrained labor force for …rm i, that is, …rm i has enough
labor force of either gender at its disposal so that it can …ll its measure 2 of entry-
level positions in any gender mix of its choice as long as the participationconstraint is
satis…ed. This would be the case, for instance, if …rm i is the only potential employer.
Recall from Lemma 1 that this …rm can extract the maximum possible per-
promotion surplus of 0.5 from men by o¤ering C¤
m = (1;1:5). Since the …rm can
…ll all upper positions with men by initially hiring measure 2 of male with this con-
tract,18 the …rm may bene…t by promoting women only if per-promotion surplus
exceeds 0.5 for women. According to Lemma 2, this is feasible by inducing female
promotion with a threshold type in (0;¹ ￿).
If this …rm hires measure „f 2 [0;2] of women at a contract (ef(￿);sf) with a
threshold type ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿), then measure „f￿ of women would be promoted. Note
„f￿ < 1 because ￿ < ¹ ￿ < 0:5. So, the …rm would …ll the remaining high posts with
men at the e¢cient contract C¤
m = (1;1:5). If there are enough men to …ll these
positions, i.e., 1 ¡ „f￿ < 2 ¡ „f, the …rm’s total pro…t, „f￿…f(￿) + (1 ¡ „f￿)0:5,
increases in „f. Otherwise, i.e., if 1¡ „f￿ > 2¡ „f, then all men pursue promotion
yet some high posts are un…lled and the …rm’s total pro…t is „f￿…f(￿)+(2¡ „f)0:5.
Since
p
2(1:5¡ wf ¡ ￿(^ u¡ wf=2)) <
p
2 so long as wf ¸ 0:5, from the de…nition
of …f(￿) in Lemma 2 – and from ￿ < ¹ ￿ < 0:5 – it follows that ￿…f(￿) < 0:5 and,
therefore, the …rm’s pro…t decreases in „f in this contingency. Hence, the …rm’s total
pro…t is maximized when measure „f of female workers are hired where „f solves
1¡ „f￿ = 2¡ „f, as summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 3: Suppose there is unconstrained labor force for …rm i. Conditional on






by hiring measure „f(￿) := 1=(1¡ ￿) 2 (1;2) of women with the contract (ef(￿);sf)
and measure 2 ¡ „f(￿) of men with the contract C¤
m. ¦(￿) is quasi-concave in (0;¹ ￿)
with a unique interior maximum. The ex ante utility of a female worker from the
contract is v(ef(￿);sf) as de…ned in (2), which is strictly increasing in ￿.
Proof: It only remains to showthat¦(￿) is quasi-concaveandhas auniqueinterior






…f(￿) ¡ 0:5+ ￿(1¡ ￿)…0
f(￿)
(1 ¡ ￿)2 =
…f(￿)2 ¡ 0:25¡ ￿(1¡ ￿)(^ u¡ wf=2)
(…f(￿)+ 0:5)(1¡ ￿)2 :
18Indi¤erence may not guarantee that a half of men pursue promotion under this contract. How-
ever, the …rm can get to arbitrarily close to this situation by o¤ering (em;sm + †) for small † > 0:
Then, in the equilibrium exactly measure 1 of men pursue promotion by exerting e =
p
2(0:5+ †).18
Di¤erentiating the numerator wrt ￿, we get 2…f(￿)…0
f(￿)¡ (1 ¡2￿)(^ u ¡wf=2) which
is negative for ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿) because ¹ ￿ < 0:5, ^ u ¡ wf=2 > 0 and …0
f(￿) < 0. Since the
denominator is positive and ¦0(0) > 0 and ¦0(¹ ￿) < 0, it follows that ¦0(￿) > 0 for all
￿ less than some ~ ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿) and ¦0(￿) < 0 for all ￿ > ~ ￿, completing the proof. QED.
D. Optimal hiring with residual workforce
Consider analternativesituationinwhichlabor forceoftotal measure2, consisting
of measure „r
f < 1 of female and measure 2¡„r
f of male, remains available for …rm i
to hire. As before, since the …rm can …ll all upper positions with men hired with the
e¢cient contract, the …rm may bene…t by promoting women only if per-promotion
pro…t exceeds 0.5 for women, which is feasible with contracts the threshold types of
which fall within (0;¹ ￿).
If this …rm induces female promotionwith a threshold type ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿) by hiringthe
residual female workforce at a contract (ef(￿);sf), then it can obtain a total pro…t of
¦r(￿;„
r
f) := 0:5+ „
r
f￿(…f(￿) ¡ 0:5) (4)
by …lling all remaining high posts with men hired at the e¢cient contract. A routine








´2(…f(￿)+ 0:5)2 + (^ u¡ wf=2)￿
(…f(￿)+ 0:5)3 < 0
for ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿). Since (4) assumes 0.5 both at ￿ = 0 and ¹ ￿, it achieves a unique
interior maximum. Thus, the optimal behavior of a …rm with residual labor supply
is characterized as below.
Lemma 4: If …rm i faces a residual labor force consisting of measure „r
f < 1
of female and measure 2 ¡ „r
f of male, …rm i obtains its maximum total pro…t of
¦r(￿
¤¤;„r
f) > 0:5 by hiring all women with the contract (ef(￿








¤¤ is independent of „r
f, hence so are the optimal contracts identi…ed
in Lemma 4. We say that a …rm uses the “defensive (contracting) strategy” if it o¤ers
the female contract (ef(￿
¤¤);sf) and the male contract C¤
m regardless the contracts
o¤ered by the other …rm.
The maximum pro…ts ¦(￿) and ¦r(￿
¤¤;„r
f) are de…ned above by presuming that
the appropriate measure of male workers choose to pursue promotion out of indi¤er-
ence given the e¢cient male contract C¤
m. Strictly speaking, therefore, those pro…ts19
are not guaranteed if the …rm o¤ers C¤
m. Nevertheless, a …rm can secure any pro…t
level arbitrarily close to these levels from below, by o¤ering a male contract that
slightly sweetens C¤
m, as explained in the next lemma.
Lemma 5: Suppose a …rm hired measure „f of women at a contract (e;s) with
￿
c(e;s) 2 (0;¹ ￿) and measure 2¡„f of men at C†
m = (em;sm+†) where † > 0 is small.
If 2¡„f ¸ 1¡„f￿c(e;s), the …rm’s pro…t in the ensuing promotion subgame exceeds
0:5+ „f￿
c(e;s)(0:5+ e ¡ s) ¡ †.
Proof: In this …rm all women up to type ￿
c(e;s) would exert e and pursue pro-
motion, since their promotion is guaranteed because i) they generate higher surplus
than any male would and ii) women of any other types …nd it a dominated strategy
to pursue promotion by exerting at least as high e¤ort level (the …rm would never
pay more than s for women promotion). If 2 ¡ „f = 1 ¡ „f￿
c(e;s), i.e., there are
exactly the same measure of men as the remaining high posts, all men would secure
promotion by exerting em because, given ii), the …rm would not deny promotion to
them. If 2¡„f > 1¡„f￿
c(e;s), then competition amongst menfor promotion restores
indi¤erence, so that they would have to exert e0 > em such that sm ¡ (e0)2=2 = 1 to
pursue promotion. Furthermore, exactly measure 1¡„f￿
c(e;s) of men would pursue
promotion: if a smaller measure of men were to pursue promotion as such, other men
would bene…t by exerting em because the …rm is obliged to promote them given ii).
In either case, the …rm’s pro…t exceeds 0:5+ „f￿
c(e;s)(0:5+ e ¡ s)¡ †. QED.
Remark: From the FOC of (5), it is easy to show that ¦0(￿
¤¤) > 0. This means
that ￿¤¤ < ~ ￿ where ~ ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿) maximizes ¦(￿) in (3). Because of this, there does not
exist amixedequilibrium analogous to that of capacity-constrainedBertrandduopoly
in Kreps-Scheinkman (1983), Lemma 6. (Maybe, K-S assume “concave” demand
function to ensure that the best-response to the other …rm’s “defensive” pricing” is
just undercutting it, which is not the case in our model.) That is, if ￿
¤¤ ¸ ~ ￿, there
would be a mixed equilibrium, in a simultaneous contract-o¤er version, in which the








An †-defensive strategy refers to the defensive strategy with C¤
m replaced with
C†
m. Suppose a …rm uses an †-defensive strategy. Since this …rm can guarantee itself
a pro…t level arbitrarily close to 0.5 by Lemma 5,
[C] either …rm can guarantee a pro…t of 0.5.
If a …rm’s …nal male contract speci…es a salary s < 1:5, then no men would exert
e >
p
2(s ¡ 1) because the …rm would never pay more than s and, therefore, the20
…rm’s surplus per male promotion, 1 + e ¡ s, is less than 0.5. By a similar reason,
the …rm’s surplus per male promotion is less than 0.5 as well if a …rm’s …nal male
contract speci…es a salary s > 1:5. If, in addition, the …rm’s …nal female contract
(e;s) is such that ￿
c(e;s) > ¹ ￿, then the …rm’s surplus per female promotion is less
than 0.5: This is trivial if the contracted e¤ort is exerted (1+e ¡s < 0:5); if women
exert e0 > e to get promoted, then they do so only up to type ￿0 < ￿c(e;s) and all
other high posts are …lled by men who generate per promotion surplus less than 0.5
and, furthermore, the surplus per women promotion is no higher because otherwise
women of type slightly above ￿
0 would exert some e¤ort in (e;e0) and get promotion
backed by lawsuit threat. In light of [C], therefore,
[D] neither …rm o¤ers a male salary other than 1.5 in conjunction with a female
contract (e;s) such that ￿
c(e;s) > ¹ ￿, because doing so is strictly dominated.
Suppose a …rm’s …nal female contract is such that ￿
c(e;s) > ¹ ￿, whence the male
contract is (e0;1:5) by [D]. Due to [C], this …rm’s hiring strategy must be to secure at
least measure 1 of male (which it can do as per (B1) and (B2)) because, regardless
of what the other …rm does, this is the only way of obtaining 0.5.
Now consider …rm i that uses the †-defensive strategy. Suppose that the other
…rm j’s female contract (e;s) has a higher value than …rm i’s, i.e., ￿
c(e;s) > ￿
¤¤.
Then, …rm j has priority in hiring and would hire no more than measure 1 of women
if ￿
c(e;s) > ¹ ￿ by the discussion just above; if ￿
c(e;s) · ¹ ￿, on the other hand, it would
hire ameasure„f(￿
c(e;s)) of women19 tomaximize pro…tby the same logicbehindthe
Lemma3. Hence, …rm i wouldhave at least measure 2¡„f(¹ ￿) of residual female labor
force and, therefore, would secure a total pro…t arbitrarily close to ¦r(￿¤¤;2¡ „f(¹ ￿))
be selecting † arbitrarily close to 0. Since …rm i would do at least as well if …rm i’s
female contract is of no worse value than …rm j’s, by symmetry between …rms, we
deduce that
[E] either …rm can guarantee a pro…t of ¦d(¹ ￿) > 0:5 by the defensive strategy,
where
¦d(￿) := ¦r(￿¤¤;2 ¡ „f(￿)) (6)
is the maximum pro…t level of a …rm facing a residual labor force after the other …rm
hired optimally with unconstrained labor force as described in Lemma 3, conditional
on hiring women with threshold type ￿ 2 (0;¹ ￿). Recall that the latter …rm’s pro…t is
¦(￿) as de…ned in (3).
19Note that the per promotion surplus must be at least 0.5 by [C], and the surplus per male
promotion should be not much lower than 0.5 (this lower bound can be calculated), to ensure a total
pro…t of at least 0.5 possible.21
At this point it is instructive to examine the relationship between the ¦(￿) and
¦d(￿) for ￿
¤¤ · ￿ · ¹ ￿. Note that ¦(￿
¤¤) > ¦d(￿
¤¤) because„f(￿
¤¤) > 1, whilst ¦(¹ ￿) =
0:5 < ¦d(¹ ￿). Furthermore, ¦d is strictly decreasing in ￿ 2 (￿
¤¤;¹ ￿) because „f(￿) is
increasing in ￿; and ¦ is single-peaked as shown in Lemma 4. These observations
generate the graphs of ¦(￿) and ¦d(￿) as below:
[Figure 4 about here]
There is a unique ￿ 2 (￿
¤¤;¹ ￿), denoted by ￿
¤, that satis…es ¦(￿) = ¦d(￿) in our
speci…cation of the model.20
Now, by an argument analogous to that leading to [E], we deduce that either
…rm can guarantee a pro…t of ¦d(￿
0) where ￿
0 2 (￿
¤;¹ ￿) such that ¦(￿
0) = ¦d(¹ ￿); then,







0); and so on ad in…nitum. By this recursive process of elimination
of dominated strategies,
Lemma 6: Either …rm can guarantee a pro…t of ¦(￿
¤) = ¦d(￿
¤) > 0:5 by the
defensive strategy.
Finally, to show that no …rm can get a pro…t higher than ¦(￿
¤), suppose to the
contrary that a …rm has a higher pro…t. The two …rms’ female contracts cannot be
of the same value: if they were, the two …rms would split labor force equally for
both would want more than measure 1 of women (because female promotion must
generate higher surplus than male for the total pro…t to exceed 0.5), therefore either
…rm would bene…t by sweetening the female contract and hire more women. Hence,
suppose …rm A’s female contract is of higher value than B’s, i.e., ￿B < ￿A · ￿
¤ where
￿i is the threshold types of …rm i = A;B. If either …rm’s female contract is not of
the form (ef(￿i);sf) as speci…ed in Lemma 3, then that …rm can revise the female
contract to (ef(￿i + ·);sf) at the …nal moment of campaign stage, where · > 0 is
small, which would increase the surplus per female promotion by a discrete amount
while maintaining ￿B < ￿A and consequently, would increase its total pro…ts. Hence,
suppose that both female contracts are of the form (ef(￿i);sf) speci…ed in Lemma 3.
Then, …rm A would hire the unconstrained optimal measure „f(￿A) of female, and













f = 2 ¡ „f(￿A) < 1 is the residual female workforce and …m
B · 0:5 is …rm
B’s surplus per male promotion. If …rm B deviates by just “undercutting” …rm A’s
thresholdtype ￿A (whichit can because￿B < ￿A) it wouldget a pro…t level arbitrarily
20It is conceivable that there may be more intersection points in alternative speci…cations, e.g.,
di¤erent distribution of ￿. Our main insights extends to these cases.22
close to ¦(￿A)¡ „r
f(0:5 ¡ …m

















Note that this is positive when …m
B = 0:5 because then this is equal to ¦(￿A) ¡
¦r(￿B;„r
f) > ¦(￿A) ¡ ¦r(￿
¤¤;„r
f) > 0. (Note that ￿A is on the downward slope of
¦(￿), for otherwise …rm A would bene…t simply by sweetening its female contract.)




0:5). Since …f(￿B) > …f(￿A), we further get (1¡ „r
f)(…f(￿B)¡0:5) > „r
f￿B(…f(￿B)¡
0:5), which implies that 1¡ „r
f ¡ „r
f￿B > 0. Since (7) is positive when …m
B = 0:5 as




f), is positive for all …m
B · 0:5. This proves the next result.
Lemma 7: In equilibrium neither …rm’s pro…ts exceed ¦(￿
¤) = ¦d(￿
¤) > 0:5.
From Lemmas 6 and 7, both …rms should have the same pro…ts ¦(￿
¤) in equilib-
rium. Furthermore, as argued already, the female contracts of the two …rms are of
the form speci…ed in Lemma 3, i.e., (ef(￿i);1:5) where ￿i ¸ ￿
¤ is the threshold type
of …rm i = A;B, and ￿A 6= ￿B so that they may not be of identical values. Then, the
…rm with higher ￿i hires optimally with unconstrained labor force as in Lemma 3,
thereby obtaining a pro…t of ¦(￿i), which implies that the higher ￿i must be ￿
¤. The
other …rm hires the residual labor force, thereby obtaining a pro…t of ¦d(￿
¤), which
implies that the lower ￿i must be ￿
¤¤. Given that the two …rms o¤er these female
contracts along with the e¢cient male contracts, it is straightforward to verify from
Figure 4 that neither …rm may bene…t by unilaterally revising its own contract o¤ers.
Hence, we have a unique characterization of equilibrium as summarized below. The
identity of the two …rms, however, may be stochastic andsymmetric: in a continuous-
time campaign stage, for instance, the two …rms may announce the contracts of the
threshold type ￿¤ with a continuous hazard rate over time conditional on the other
…rm has not done so already, and once one …rm has done so, the other …rm would
announce the contracts of the threshold type ￿
¤¤.
Theorem 1: In equilibrium, one …rm o¤ers the female contract (ef(￿
¤);1:5) and
the e¢cient male contract C¤
m = (1;1:5), and the other …rm o¤ers the defensive
contracts, (ef(￿
¤¤);1:5) and C¤
m = (1;1:5) for female and male workers, respectively.
The former …rm hires measure „f(￿
¤) 2 (1;2) of women and measure 2¡ „f(￿
¤) of
men and the latter …rm hires the residual labor force. The two …rms have identical
pro…ts ¦(￿¤) = ¦d(￿¤) > 0:5, however, the ex ante utility of women is higher when
hired by former …rm than by the latter. Furthermore, every female worker promoted
in either …rm generates a higher surplus to the …rm but obtains a lower net utility
than any promoted male worker.23
Note that in equilibrium workers of either gender get paid the same salary in high
posts, although female workers have to work harder to get promoted (ef(￿
¤) > 1).
The equality of high-post salaries results from the assumption that the minimum
female salary to preclude their departure is equal to the men’s e¢cient high-post
salary, i.e., 2^ u = sm = 1:5. As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the cases in
which o¤ering the e¢cient male wage would render female promotions identical to
male promotions by precluding any departure risk, which is the case if 2^ u < 1:5. In
these cases (as long as 2^ u > 1), the equilibrium remains the same with one change:
female workers have to work harder than male workers to get promoted, yet they get
paid less after promotion. In the opposite cases, i.e., 2^ u > 1:5, the equilibrium also
remains the same, although now the promoted female workers get paid more than
their male counterparts, however this extra salary falls short of compensating the
extra e¤ort they have to exert. In all these cases, therefore, female workers in high
posts generate a higher surplus to the …rm per post but obtain a lower net utility
than their male counterparts.24
4. Discussion, Extensions and Policy Analysis
A. Discussion: di¤erences with signaling and ‘standard’ screening models
In our framework, we rule out signaling, and instead adopt a screening approach.
What would happen if instead we allowed for signaling? Not much. The model we
consider is one where the only di¤erences between women concern the probability
with which they will be hit by a shock that gives them a positive (and of …xed value)
utility from leaving the workforce (denoted as b u). Since we concentrate on the case
where promotions are secure, this implies that, once promoted, all women become
identical. So, in our framework, the agent’s type does not a¤ect the principal’s utility.
In that sense, there is no value for a woman to signal her type. This is in contrast
with more standard models (such as Spence 1973), where workers have an incentive
to signal that they are of a high type, as this makes them more valuable for the
employer (and therefore allows them to earn a higher wage).
Similar to what said above for signaling, the key distinction between ours and
‘standard’ screening models is that here the instruments available to the principal
(wage in case of promotion, and e¤ort necessary for promotion) a¤ect all women in
the same way. The only di¤erence between types is their reservation utility. The
utility obtained by a woman who decides to go for promotion is independent of her
type.
In standard screening models, distortions in e¤ort are introduced in order to
reduce the agents’ informational rents. Types with a lower disutility from e¤ort have
an incentive to mimic those who su¤er a greater disutility, in order to obtain a larger
compensation. To reduce this e¤ect, the principal introduces distortions, namely
ine¢ciently low e¤ort for all but the lowest type. In our model this type of e¤ect
is absent, since greater e¤ort a¤ects all women in the same way. So the rationale
for the distortion in the e¤ort level required from promoted women is fundamentally
di¤erent from that we would normally encounter with signaling (and, as seen above,
signaling).
B. Extensions
E¤ort not veri…able. We carried out our analysis presuming that e¤ort level is suf-
…ciently veri…able so that the workers are protected by the court if they do not get
promoted after meeting the contractual requirement. In some circumstances, though,
it may be too costly to verify the e¤ort level. In the extreme case that it is unver-
i…able at all, the e¤ort component of a contract becomes cheap-talk. It is natural,
therefore, that there exist multiple equilibria supported by various self-con…rming
belief pro…les, and such beliefs may be the reputation of …rms that they acquired in
previous interactions for future bene…ts. In this context, the equilibrium described in
Theorem 1 continues to be anequilibrium, albeit no longer the unique one, supported25
by the beliefs that the e¤ort levels speci…ed there are expected for promotion and a
su¢cient number of workers will full the expectation.
Contracts also specify wage in period 1. In the main analysis, for ease of exposition
we disalloweda contract tospecify a wage for period 1. Allowing this does not change
anything strategically for male contracts because salaries in period1 and 2are perfect
substitutes. For female contracts, however, this would allow the …rms to reduce the
threshold type of a contract and enhance its value at the same time. This additional
scope may generate some bene…ts that might be shared between …rms and workers,
yet the essential features of equilibrium in Theorem 1 remain valid: One …rm hires the
residual labor force with the defensive contracts, and the other …rm hires as if facing
unconstrained workforce but with a su¢ciently favorable female contract so that the
former …rm would not undercut it, and consequently, the two …rms get identical pro…t
levels.
More than two …rms. Although our analysis dealt with competition of two symmetric
…rms in a labor market, it can be extended to two …rms of di¤erent sizes and to more
than two …rms, generating qualitatively similar results. It seems possible that it can
be extended further to a game that incudes an initial stage in which potentials …rms
make entry and size decisions.
C. Policy Analysis
Our model identi…es a glass ceiling phenomenon for high-rank positions. In con-
trast to previous literature (such as Lazear and Rosen 1990) this glass ceiling is
unjusti…ed; o¤ering women the same promotion o¤er as men would be su¢cient to
erase any di¤erence between men and women in high-rank jobs (since all promoted
women would remain in the job with certainty).
The disadvantage su¤ered by women in high-rank jobs is essentially a ‘spillover’
of the disadvantage they su¤er when remaining in low-rank positions. In low-rank
positions, women will always leave if hit by the shock (since in this case their produc-
tivity outside the job market is strictly higher than their productivity on the job).
Hence, a woman’s expected productivity in the low-rank job is strictly below that of
a man. This results in women earning strictly lower wages than men in low-rank jobs.
Note that, although on average this lower wage is justi…ed, some women (i.e., those
with a low or zero probability of being hit by the shock) are earning less than their
productivity. For those women, the existence of more ‘family-friendly’ fellow women
imposes a negative externality.
The fact that women do have a lower expected productivity than men in low-rank
jobs spills over to higher-rank jobs, where women are disadvantaged in spite of being
potentially identical to men.26
One obvious way to eliminate the problem would be that of imposing a policy that
ensures that men and women earn the same wage in low-rank jobs. (Note: this would
result in …rms o¤ering the same terms of promotion to men and women. However, it
would also result in a measure zero of women being promoted, i.e., only those women
who have exactly zero probability of being hit by the shock).
It is not clear however that such a policy would be feasible. Essentially, women
in low rank jobs are on average less productive than men. So a policy that obliges
…rms to pay their low-rank male and female employees exactly the same wage would
simply result in two types of…rms emerging, those employing only female workers,and
those employing only male workers in low-rank positions. Under perfect competition,
in each type of …rm employees would be paid their expected productivity, but, cru-
cially, wages in …rms specialized in female workers would be lower than those in …rms
specialized in male workers.
In what follows, we review a few simple policy measures that may be imposed on
the …rms’ contractual o¤ers for high-rank jobs, and discuss the extent to which they
may a¤ect the competitive equilibrium described in the previous section.
Gender-free contracts. First, consider a policy requiring that all contracts o¤ered
must be gender-free, i.e., the same set of contracts are available for workers of either
gender to choose one from and apply for. So long as the promotion decisions among
quali…ed workers are left to the …rm’s discretion, the competitive equilibrium con-
tinues to be an equilibrium under this policy, supported by the belief that the …rm
may promote women only if they select the contract intended for them. Therefore,
although there are other equilibria, including one in which all workers get promoted
in the same terms, putting this policy in place does not warrant transition to a more
equitable promotion outcome. This is especially evident when the e¤ort level is un-
veri…able: the e¤ort component of a contract being cheap-talk, the contracts in the
competitive equilibrium can be interpreted as being identical contracts with di¤erent
implicit understanding of the requirements.
A certain fraction of women must be promoted. Consider an alternative policy that
requires each …rm to promote at least a …xed fraction, say ￿
R, of its female employees,
i.e., it imposes a restriction on the threshold female type that it may implement. If
￿
R > ￿
¤, then this policy will improve the welfare of promoted women; So long as
￿
R < ¹ ￿, however, the main features of the competitive equilibrium (albeit of a lesser
degree) will remain in the ensuing equilibrium, in which one …rm hires the residual
labor force with the e¢cient male contract and a female contract of threshold type
￿
R, and the other …rm hires as if facing unconstrained workforce but with female
contract su¢ciently favorable so that the former …rm would not undercut, and the
two …rms get identical pro…ts. If ￿
R > ¹ ￿, then a reversed glass ceiling phenomenon
arises: men have to work harder to get promoted, yet may get paid less than their27
female counterparts. Only when ￿
R = ¹ ￿, such a policy would correct the glass ceiling
phenomenon. However, such remedy would be temporary in nature unless the policy
were to remain in place permanently, for the competitive equilibrium would reemerge
when the policy is lifted.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have provided an economic equilibrium theory of the glass ceiling
phenomena The model provides a theoretical equilibrium where there is a lower num-
ber of female employees in higher positions, women have to work harder than men
to obtain what are equivalent jobs, on average women are then paid less than men
when promoted and where the equilibrium implies that there will be female friendly
and female unfriendly organisations, in a model where women are not formally dis-
criminated against.
Women who wish to be career committed are worse o¤ than their male since
they have to make an observable commitment, which entails working harder than the
equivalent male would do to obtain the same promotion. Firms compete Bertrand
style for female employees but even so are able to hire women at remuneration levels
that do not re‡ect the higher productivity that is generated by this extra e¤ort
(relative to the male remuneration contract). Some …rms are ‘female friendly’ and
hire larger numbers of women at remuneration that provides a small surplus per
female. Other …rms are ‘female unfriendly’ and hire less women and make a greater
surplus per female employee. The net e¤ect is that both make the same pro…t. As
indicated women are not formally discriminated against by employees but it is the
case that women who wish to be promoted have to work harder for less pay simply
because, and only because, they are female. In this sense career women are clearly
disadvantaged in the workplace.
Unfortunately, the model is somewhat depressing in terms of what can be done to
improve things for career women. Insisting that contracts cannot be gender speci…c is
not su¢cient to improve things. Restrictions can be set on the minimum percentage
of women that constitute the senior positions. There are two problems here. One is
that the planner needs agreat deal of information and is unlikely to get the proportion
right. More of an issue is that a short-lived intervention will not help once it is lifted,
unlike most statistical discrimination models. The gender disparity will go away if on
average male and female employees are equally likely to wish to take an employment
break or reduce their commitment to the job.28
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